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was exceeded. If injunctive relief had been withheld, the respondent could still
have sought damages in a subsequent action at law on the theory that the boycott had subjected her to unjustifiable tortious conduct.- Moreover, and perhaps most striking, the Supreme Court's opinion emphasized the letter rather
than the spirit of the Act." Although in the light of the facts presented the
decision creates little cause for sympathy with the union, the danger of a return
to a system of judicial settlement of labor disputes by injunction may be so real
as to militate against even the slightest inroads on the Act. 23

ILLINOIS TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
The infant plaintiff was severely injured in a fall from the unguarded roof of
a wooden ticket office used as a part of the St. Philip Stadium, owned and operated by the Servite Fathers, an Illinois charitable corporation. The plaintiff sued
on the theory that the wooden roof was an attractive nuisance, easily accessible
to children and negligently maintained by the defendant in an unsafe condition.
The defendant pleaded that because of its eleemosynary character it could not
be held liable. Admitting the charitable character of the defendant corporation,
the plaintiff nevertheless asserted liability because, prior to the accident, the
Servite Fathers had procured a comprehensive general liability policy which
effectively protected its trust fund. Attached to this policy was a rider which,
in part, provided: "i. the company... will not use, either in the adjustment
of claims or in the defense of suits against the insured, the immunity of the insured from tort liability, unless requested by the insured to interpose such defense.", The trial court reasoned that the defendant was absolutely immune
from liability and that the indemnifying insurance did not create a liability
where none had previously existed. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed on the ground that the insurance policy created a separate fund, apart
from the trust fund of the charitable corporation, which could be used to compensate any person injured as a result of the negligence of the defendant.
Wendt v. Servite Fathers.2
at common law and under Section 20 of the Clayton Act. See Gregory, Labor and the Law
184-99 (1946).
21
Ibid., at 120-27.
= Report of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, S. Rep. 163, 72d Cong. ist Sess., at
(1932). "Section r3 of the bill defines various terms used in the act, and it is not believed
that any criticism has been or will be made to these definitions.... In order that the limitation may not be whittled away by refined definitions of what persons are to be regarded as
legitimately involved in labor disputes, the bill undertakes specifically to designate those persons who are entitled to invoke the protections...."
23See Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 409
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x Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 620, 76 N.E. 2d 342, 343 (1947).
2332 III. App. 6z8, 76 N.E. 2d 342 (1947).
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This holding represents a departure from prior Illinois decisions,3 and appears
to be in conflict with another recent decision by the appellate court.4 Nevertheless, it follows the dominant trend in judicial thinking and can be reconciled
with the local precedents, narrowly construed.
It is generally conceded that the American doctrine of immunity of charitable
institutions from tort liability originated in an English dictum delivered in
I846.s This dictum, repudiated in the jurisdiction which produced it,6 took root

in this country,7 though not without some resistance. 8 Some courts, however,
desirous of checking the spread of another area of "protected negligence," have
modified the strict rule. The decisions now run the gamut from full liability to

full immunity, with a generous accompaniment of dissents, which Justice
Rutledge has called, in his scholarly opinion in the Georgetown College case, the
"earmarks of law in flux."9
The doctrine of strict immunity found its way into Illinois law more than
forty years ago in the much-cited decision in Parksv. Northwvestern University. 0

In that case, a student lost an eye through the alleged negligence of a professor.
The court held that Northwestern University was a charitable corporation not-

withstanding the fact that its students paid tuition, and that the rule exempting
such a charity from liability for the negligence of its servants was necessary to
prevent a diversion of its trust funds. If the trustees could not directly divert

funds from the purposes for which they were donated, the negligent acts of the
corporate servants could not be the basis of an indirect diversion.
Only two of the Illinois decisions involve the question of the effect of liability
insurance. In Myers v. Young Men's ChristianAss'n," immunity was sustained
3 Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital, 335 Ill. 42, x66 N.E. 461 (1929); Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 I1. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (i9o5); Myers v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n,
316 Ill. App. I77,44 N.E. 2d 755 (1942), noted in io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 211 (1943); Maretick
v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N.E. 2d 1012 (1938), noted
in 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5r8 ('939); see Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 494,498, ioi N.E.
96o, 962 (1913).
4 Piper v. Epstein, 326 Il. App. 4o0, 62 N.E. 2d 139 (1945).
5 "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the
author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose."
Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 513 (1846); see also Duncan v.
Findlater, 6 Clark & Fin. 894 (1839); Holliday v. St. Leonard's, ii C.B.N.S. 192 (186i).
6 Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871); Mersey Docks Trustees v-

Gibbs, L.R. i H.L. 93 (i866).
7 Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1884); McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
8 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 41 (1879).
9 President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F. 2d-8io, 812 (App. D.C.,
1942). For other discerning opinions in this field, see Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n,
226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (i939); Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, r9i Ala. 572, 68 So. 4
(zgis).
'o 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 59' (19o5).
-3x6 Ill. App. 177, 44 N.E. 2d 755 (1942), noted in io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 211 (z943). For
a discussion of the contrary view see O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo.
259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 567 (1940).
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on the theory that it was improper to inform the jury that the defendant was
protected by liability insurance. That question was not in issue in the instant
case, nor was it controlling in the second Illinois case, Piperv. Epstein. There
the court, in upholding the insured defendant hospital's claim of immunity,
stated: "The exemption from liability is absolute. The rule of respondeatsuperior
is not applicable to charitable institutions.... ." It was considered that the
"reason for procuring the insurance is found in the provisions requiring the insurer to defend all claims and actions for damages, whether groundless or not,
based on negligence of the officers and agents of the hospital."'3 The court relied
on the Parks case which, in turn, relied on the "trust-fund" theory. As to the
first of these statements, the liability is not necessarily absolute, and, as to the
second, the only plausible reason in the Servite Fatherscase for acquiring liability
insurance was the charity's desire to protect those injured through its negligence. Moreover, there was no showing that the insured requested the immunity defense to be raised, which it might have done under the terms of the
rider.14 "The immunity doctrine was devised for the benefit of the charitable
corporation, and if the corporation wishes to waive immunity, we know of no
principle in law which would prevent it from doing so."' s
Although the court in the instant case stated its personal disposition to discontinue the protection of charitable corporations from tort liability, it felt constrained to follow the decision of the supreme court in the Parks case, and consequently limited itself to a holding that "where insurance exists and provides a
fund from which tort liability may be collected so as not to impair the trust fund,
the defense of immunity is not available."' 6
Courts have generally categorized the rationales behind the granting of immunity under i) the "trust-fund" doctrine,'7 2) the specific inapplicability of
"326 l.App. 4o0, 62 N.E. 2d 139 (1945).
Ibid., at 410, 144.
"It is also a matter of common knowledge that the Catholic Bishop of Chicago stipulates
that insurance companies when defending local Catholic charities shall not plead the 'trust
fund' theory as a defense." 21 Chi-Kent Rev. 256, 258 (1943), noting Myers v. Young Men's
Christian Ass'n of Quincy, 316 ll. App. 177, 44 N.E. 2d 755 (1942). See also Kos v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 317 Ill.
App. 248, 45 N.E. 2d ioo6 (1942).
isWendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 6r8, 634, 76 N.E. 2d 342, 349 (1947).
A Ibid. This view is in accord with two previous trial court decisions. Well Cartage Co. v.
Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth, 38-C-3374, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, cited
23
14

in

20

Chi.Bar. Rec. 141 (1939); Shaleen v. The Newberry Library, 39-S-X1479, Superior Court

of Cook County, Illinois, cited in Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1941-1942, 21 Chi-Kent
Rev. 1,8 (1942). Previously, immunity was not applied when the action arose out of contract,
even though the effect would be a diversion of the trust funds. Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital
170 Ill.
App. 81 (1912). Even in contract actions, however, if the basis of the claim was the
carelessness of the servants of the charity, immunity would be applied. See Wattman v. St.
Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 I11.App. 244, 41 N.E. 2d 314 (1942).
'7 For a full discussion of this rationale, see the concurring opinion by Wolfe, J., in Sessions
v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 487, 78 P. 2d 645, 653 (3938). In
the instant case the plaintiff waived all rights to levy execution upon the realty or other assets
of the defendant.
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respondeat superior to charitable institutions,," 3) the implied waiver by the
beneficiary of a charity,9 and 4) the catchall of "public policy."' 2° Modification
of the strict rule has varied according to court-made distinctions between the
stranger and the beneficiary, the degrees of agency, and individual and corporate parties." Of course any such modifications of the strict rule are inconsistent with the trust-fund diversion rationale, since the trust fund will necessarily be depleted, the donor's intention violated, and donors may be deterred
from making contributions to charities'. But simpler notions of "fault" have
given way in many fields to notions of efficient distribution of loss.- Losses suffered by individuals from the operation of an enterprise should be distributed
among all who benefit from the undertaking. Justice Rutledge agrees that "if
there is a danger of dissipation, insurance is now available to guard against it
and prudent management will provide the protection. It is highly doubtful that
any substantial charity would be destroyed or donation deterred by the cost
'
required to pay the premiums."' 3

The policy of loss-distribution finds expression in the limitations on the doctrine of ultra vires in the law of corporations,24 the law of trusts,2 and the law of
agency. 6 Although charities are subject to full liability in at least four states,2 7
and partial liability in more, 8 there is no evidence that charitable donations
X8This is founded upon the notion that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies only
where the master derives some profit from the actions of the servant; since charities are not
engaged in commercial enterprise, the rule has no application. See Hearns v. Waterbury
Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Ati. 595 (895).

19The beneficiary of a charity is considered to have assumed the risk of injury as part of
the consideration for the gratuitous services rendered him. The fact that this is a mere fiction,
not based on actuality, is shown most strikingly in the case of the unconscious accident victim.
See Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. 2d 520 (193i); Powers v. Massachusetts Homceopathic Hospital, iog Fed. 294 (C.C.A. ist, xgoi).
20This frank theory has the advantage of throwing the choice which the courts or legis,
latures must make into sharp relief. Is placing the full burden of an injury on the injured
individual preferable to requiring a charity to recompense him for its negligence, even though
the latter course involves a "diversion" of the charity's trust funds? For a clear-cut delineation of the issues, see 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 401 (935).
- For an enlightening analysis of these distinctions, see President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F. 2d 8io (App. D.C., 1942).
- See Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 729 (1941).
"3President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F 2d 81o, 823 (App. D.C.,
1942).

24 1o

Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 4902 (1931).

s3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 713,

725, 731-35

(935);

(93).
26See

Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life,

Rest., Trusts §§

2 Univ.

174,

264

Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1935).

27Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, go N.H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (@939); Sisters of The
Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, r83 Okla. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (938); Sheehan v. North Country

Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. 2d 28 (1937), noted in z4 N.Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 534
(1937); Borwege v. City of Owatonna, go Minn. 394, 251 N.W. 915 (1933).
8 See Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 624, 628-29 (1944).
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have decreased in those states or increased in those states favoring strict
immunity.
In addition, charities now are more like business enterprises than in the past
-they have a capacity for bearing loss undreamed of at the time when the doctrine of immunity was first formulated. Then, a single negligence action might
have wiped out a small charity with meager funds. Now, however, charities are
in a position to protect their funds. It is an odd rule that would place the whole
of the loss upon a single injured individual if, fortuitously, the negligence of a
charity causes that loss. The decision in the instant case, although unfortunately limited, points the way for the Illinois Supreme Court or for the legislature to join those states which have abandoned the unfair and outmoded doctrine of immunity.

FIDUCIARY DUTY OF INSURER IN SETTLEMENT
OF CLAIMS
In Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, the Supreme Court of Iowa
struck down a purported accord and satisfaction, seemingly relying on the rule
in Pinnel'sCase,but also asserting the unique notion that an insurance company
is under a fiduciary duty to its policyholders.2 The plaintiff, administrator of
the estate of the deceased beneficiary, brought an action at law on a $5,000
membership certificate of the defendant association to recover for the accidental
death of the insured. The certificate provided for an indemnity of $5,ooo in the
case of death resulting exclusively from bodily injuries accidentally received
but disclaimed liability in excess of i/io of that amount if death or disability
should be caused by, or be effected or aggravated by, "heart" disease.
The insured, who was sixty-eight years old, was severely shaken up and
bruised in a highway collision on June 25, 1945. He complained of pains in his
abdomen, and onlookers brought him to his home, where he died within an hour.
A doctor examined him about ten minutes after his death. In the proofs of
loss the doctors stated that the insured died of coronary thrombosis, initiated
by the accident and subsequent nervous shock. No X-rays were made and no
autopsy was performed.
The proofs of loss were delivered to the defendant, and no other correspondence took place. The defendant mailed to the insured's wife a check for $500,
which stated on its face that its indorsement by her as payee would be settlement in full for all claims for indemnity arising under the membership. There
was evidence that she knew that the insured had suffered from previous attacks
1 29 N.W. 2d 559 (Iowa,

1947).

' The notion should be contrasted with the well established doctrine that in cases of suretyship and marine insurance there is a strict duty of full disclosure, amounting to a fiduciary
duty owed by the insured to the insurer. Richards, Insurance §§ 79, 80 (4th ed., 1932);
Arant, Suretyship § 28 (i931).

